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Abstract 
 
Objective: To investigate ambiguous and risky decision-making in obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) patients 
grouped according to established primary symptom dimensions. The difficulties of OCD patients in real-life quite often 
seem related to situations of decision-making, for example, whether to check the door or clean the house. Decision-
making appears on the face of it impaired in the clinical OCD setting in the context of doubting and uncertainty. 
Methods: The participants were administered the Iowa Gambling Task and the Cambridge Gambling Task, reputed 
to be established measures of ambiguous and risky decision-making respectively. Background measures included as-
sessments with standard clinical and psychological questionnaires. The OCD patients (n=72) were grouped according 
to their primary symptom dimensions using the Dimensional Yale-Brown Obsessive–Compulsive Scale and compared 
with a healthy control group (n=66). 
Results: Risky decision-making related to rationality was impaired for patients in the dimensions symmetry/order and 
sexual/religious, and the deliberation time to make a decision was particularly slow for patients in the dimensions 
safety and contamination. A deficit in ambiguous decision-making was found in patients showing aggressive and sym-
metry/order symptoms.  
Conclusion: This study is believed to be the first to present selective deficits in different OCD symptom dimensions re-
lated to decision-making. The data confirm the necessary role of intact interactions between cognitive and emotional 
processing (German J Psychiatry 2011; 14: 13-25).  
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Introduction 
ecurrent and intrusive thoughts and rigid and stereo-
typical compulsive behaviors are core characteristics 
of obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000). An ongoing debate about the 
nature of cognitive deficits thought to underlie the disorder’s 
behavioral dysfunctions has elucidated few consistent find-
ings (e.g, Kuelz et al., 2004). Decision-making, a cognitive 
process to evaluate environmental information in terms of 
rewards and punishments in order to select the right course 
of action for the benefit of the self and others, seems im-
paired in OCD. The role of uncertainty in decision-making 
has yet to be systematically investigated in OCD (Cavedini et 
al., 2006) and indecisiveness has even been posited to be a 
basic characteristic of OCD (Summerfeldt et al., 2004a). 
Worry is also thought to underpin difficulties making deci-
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sions and there are attempts to conceptualize OCD as a 
disorder of decision-making (Sachdev & Malhi, 2005). Deci-
sion-making performance has revealed that OCD partici-
pants request more information about and spend more time 
deliberating over low-risk scenarios and OCD-relevant deci-
sions compared to non-anxious controls (Foa et al., 2003). 
OCD patients request more information before making a 
decision and excessive worry and doubt could therefore 
mediate difficulties in decision-making (Foa et al., 2003; 
Milner et al., 1971). Several subjective experiences have been 
suggested to explain why OCD patients do not feel satisfied 
after a compulsive act is carried out and which seem impor-
tant factors that trigger patients to perform the repetitive 
behaviors. For example, ‘premonitory urges’ (Leckman et al., 
1993) and experiences of ‘just right’ (Leckman et al., 1994), 
‘not just right’ (Coles et al., 2005), and ‘incompleteness’ 
(Summerfeldt et al., 2004b) are attempts to explain the dys-
functional behavior. The latter has recently been found to be 
most associated with patients in the dimension symme-
try/order because they experience their actions and percep-
tions as incomplete (Ecker & Gönner, 2008). Prolonged 
deliberation before a decision is made and reward uncer-
tainty in OCD have been linked to uncharacteristic orbi-
tofrontal cortex (OFC) activity (Sachdev & Malhi, 2005). 
Therefore, why patients do not feel that their experiences 
and actions are right, lends itself readily to explain decision-
making difficulties in OCD.  
Traditionally, findings from neuroimaging studies show that 
decision-making irregularities in OCD are presumed to in-
volve the OFC (e.g., Nielen et al., 2002). However, Cavedini 
et al. (2006, p. 12) rightly pointed out that different test 
techniques applied in decision-making demonstrated im-
paired functioning of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC). At present it remains unclear whether the OFC 
or the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is more involved in obsessive 
doubting and uncertainty as characteristics of decision-
making in OCD. Therefore, studying decision-making be-
havior in OCD may stimulate further insight into the cogni-
tive neurobiology of the disorder (Nielen et al., 2002). It is 
argued that a faulty information processing system in OCD 
(Dittrich et al., 2010a) can partly be explained by deficiencies 
in emotional processing associated with decision-making 
because of the strong involvement of the OFC in emotional 
processing. Consequently, two well established cognitive 
tasks assessing decision-making abilities in OCD, the Iowa 
Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994) and the Cam-
bridge Gambling Task (CGT; Rogers et al., 1999), were 
employed in the present study. The former requires deci-
sions that involve choices associated with different rewards 
and punishment and where the relevant outcomes remain 
hidden (ambiguous decision-making) whereas the latter relies 
on choices between contingencies that are presented in a 
readily comprehensible format (risky decision-making). 
However, recently it has been proposed that the IGT is 
thought to measure both ambiguous and risky decision-
making (Brand et al., 2007; Lawrence et al., 2009) whereas 
the CGT probes decisions under risk only (Clark et al., 
2008). The VMPFC is thought to mediate intact perfor-
mance on the IGT (Bechara et al., 1998; Cavedini et al., 
2006; Lawrence et al., 2009) whereas optimal performance 
on the CGT has been found to rely on the orbital PFC 
(Rogers et al., 1999). Furthermore, the possibility of probing 
OFC pathology in psychiatric disorders by administering 
decision-making tasks such as the CGT has also been sug-
gested (Clark & Manes, 2004).  
The neuropsychological performance in OCD on the IGT 
and the CGT has so far not yielded any concrete result pat-
terns. On the IGT, both impairments (Cavallaro et al., 2003; 
Cavedini et al., 2002) and intact performance have been 
demonstrated relative to healthy controls (Lawrence et al., 
2006; Nielen et al., 2002). The severity of OCD as measured 
by the Yale-Brown Obsessive–compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; 
Goodman et al., 1989) as well as anxiety did suggest a poorer 
performance in the patient group as reported in Nielen et al. 
(2002). Compromised performance on the IGT has also 
been displayed in OCD patients who fail to respond to 
pharmacotherapy (Cavedini et al., 2002). So far, OCD pa-
tients have not been impaired on the CGT (Chamberlain et 
al., 2007a, b; Watkins et al., 2005). Interestingly, Tourette’s 
syndrome patients were impaired in rational decisions on the 
CGT relative to a group of OCD patients and healthy con-
trols (Watkins et al., 2005). The question of comorbidity and 
similarities in clinical symptoms between OCD and other 
psychiatric conditions will be addressed in the current study 
and specifically how this might be related to patients in dif-
ferent symptom dimensions. OCD patients that present with 
comorbid motor tics are often associated with the symptom 
dimensions obsession/checking and symmetry/order 
(Leckman et al., 1997; Mataix-Cols et al., 2005). Specifically it 
was predicted that patients in the dimension safety are more 
impaired compared to other symptom dimensions and the 
healthy controls in time taken to make decisions on the 
CGT. This is expected considering that they are potentially 
slow in executing decisions in relation to situations they find 
potentially dangerous. For the CGT, it was hypothesized that 
the OCD group and the healthy controls would show differ-
ences in decision-making performance in relation to the 
variable rational decisions.  
Methods 
Participants 
There were 72 OCD patients (44 female, 28 male) meeting 
criteria for a DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000) diagnosis and 66 healthy controls (45 female, 21 male) 
who participated. Mean age in the OCD group was 41.8 
years (standard deviation (SD) = 12.5) compared to 37.6 
years (SD = 14.4) in the healthy control group. At the time 
of testing 65 OCD patients received selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) medication. The healthy partici-
pants who volunteered to take part were recruited from the 
University of Hertfordshire and the general Hertfordshire 
population by newspaper and posted advertisements.  
The OCD patients were grouped into their primary symp-
tom dimensions on the basis of their current primary obses-
sions and/or compulsions assessed by the Dimensional 
Yale-Brown Obsessive–compulsive Scale (DY-BOCS; 
Rosario-Campos et al., 2006). Further details of the recruit-
ment procedure and the participants are described in Dit-
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trich et al. (2010a). The following obsessive–compulsive 
(OC) symptom dimensions were established from the pa-
tient sample: 
(1) obsessions about harm due to aggres-
sion/injury/violence/natural disasters predominantly 
to themselves including an urge to feel safe and pro-
tect the self and related compulsions (safety, n = 23). 
(2) obsessions about harm due to aggres-
sion/injury/violence/natural disasters predominantly 
to family members and others and related compul-
sions (aggression, n = 7). 
(3) obsessions about symmetry/’just-right’ perceptions 
and compulsions to count or order/arrange (symme-
try/order, n = 14). 
(4) contamination obsessions and cleaning compulsions 
(contamination, n = 22).  
(5) obsessions concerning sexual/moral/religious obses-
sions and related compulsions (sexual/religious, n = 
6). 
The study was approved by the Hertfordshire Partnership 
NHS Trust Local Research Ethics Committee, UK. Data in 
this manuscript were obtained according to the Helsinki 
Declaration.  
Design  
The experimental study used a mixed design, with the be-
tween-subjects factor group (OCD or OC symptom dimen-
sions/healthy controls). For the IGT, the within-subject 
factors were card selection by condition (advanta-
geous/disadvantageous) and block (disadvantageous card 
selections in block 1 to 5). For the CGT, the within-subject 
factors were ratio of colored boxes (6:4/7:3/8:2/9:1) and 
condition (ascending/descending) as a function of delibera-
tion time to make a decision, rational decisions and points 
gambled. 
Materials 
The clinical and psychological testing measures and the two 
neuropsychological tasks administered in the current study 
are separately described below.   
Clinical and psychological testing 
A range of tests was applied to assess the clinical and psy-
chological status (see details described in Dittrich et al., 
2010a): Montgomery-Åsberg Depression Rating Scale 
(MADRS; Montgomery & Åsberg, 1979); State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983); Cognitive As-
sessment Instrument of Obsessions and Compulsions 
(CAIOC-18, 18-item version; Dittrich et al., 2010a, 2011a); 
Compulsive Personality Assessment Scale (CPAS; Fineberg 
et al., 2007); Sheehan Disability Scale (SDS; Sheehan et al., 
1996); Locus of Control (LoC; Rotter, 1966); National Adult 
Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982).  
Neuropsychological tasks 
On the IGT the ability to balance immediate rewards against 
long-term negative consequences is assessed. The partici-
pants are presented with four decks of cards on a computer 
screen, named A, B, C and D. The task is to maximize profit 
on a loan of 2000 play money. In total, 100 card selections 
are made but the participants are not informed of this. One 
card at a time is selected from any of the four decks and 
participants are told that they can switch between the decks 
at any time and as often as they wish. In the long run, the 
four decks of cards are associated with monetary losses 
(decks A and B) and gains (decks C and D). The reward 
from selecting a card from decks A and B is 100, but on 
every 10 cards a heavy loss of 1250 is encountered, so the 
total net loss is 250. From decks C and D the participant 
gets 50 for each card selected, but the loss at every ten cards 
is only 250, and therefore the gain at every ten cards is in 
fact 250. Dependent measures were total number of disad-
vantageous (A and B) and advantageous (C and D) cards 
selected and the pattern of responding over five blocks to 
establish whether the decision-making process was random 
or deliberate. 
The CANTAB (Cambridge Cognition, 2006) CGT is a deci-
sion-making task that requires the participants to decide 
whether a yellow token is hidden behind a red or a blue box 
by using a touch screen and to bet a certain amount of their 
current points total. The proportion of red and blue boxes is 
varied over the course of the task between 6:4, 7:3, 8:2 and 
9:1. For example, the 6:4 (red:blue boxes) ratio would indi-
cate that there is a 60% chance for the yellow token to be 
hidden behind the red box. The bet options are either pre-
sented sequentially in an ascending or descending order. In 
the ascending order the bets are presented as 5%, 25%, 50%, 
75% and 90% of total points collected whereas in the de-
scending condition the order of bets presented is reversed. 
Participants play four game blocks, each consisting of eight 
betting trials in both the ascending and descending condi-
tions. At the start of each block, the participants are given 
100 points and if during the block the total points drop to 
one (1) the current block ends and the remaining blocks in 
that condition cannot be completed. The next block in the 
other condition (ascending or descending) is subsequently 
presented. Comparison of ascending and descending condi-
tions enables impulsive behavior to be separated from genu-
ine risk-taking behavior (genuine risk takers must inhibit 
motor responding for many seconds in the ascending condi-
tion waiting for the bets to increase and the opposite behav-
ior must be displayed in the descending condition). Key 
measures include percentage of rational decisions, percent-
age of points gambled when the most likely outcome was 
chosen (rational decision) and deliberation time to choose 
the most likely outcome. The three variables may each inter-
act with the ratio of red and blue boxes. At the 9:1 ratio, 
participants should pick the likely outcome more consis-
tently, be more confident in the decisions and hence bet 
more, and may deliberate less, in comparison with trials at 
the 6:4 ratio. The presentation of the ascending and descend-
ing conditions was counterbalanced such that half the par-
ticipants were given the ascending condition first and the 
other half started with the descending condition first.  
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Procedure 
On the day of testing during the clinical interview the pa-
tients were screened with the Mini International Neuropsy-
chiatric Interview (MINI; Sheehan et al., 1998) to exclude 
past and present history of mental problems. During the 
same session, ratings of OCD severity (Y-BOCS), depression 
(MADRS), OC personality (CPAS), predicted verbal IQ 
(NART) and the primary OC dimensional symptom profiles 
of the patients were established (DY-BOCS). The self-rated 
background questionnaires STAI, CAIOC, SDS and the LoC 
were either completed on the day of recruitment or at home 
and posted back using a pre-paid envelope. The healthy 
control participants were assessed with the MINI and rated 
on clinical measures (Y-BOCS, MADRS, CPAS) and the 
NART. The self-rated clinical and psychological measures 
(STAI, CAIOC, SDS, LoC) were completed on the day of 
testing. The neuropsychological tasks were administered in a 
quiet room in the hospital clinical or at the University of 
Hertfordshire.  
Data Analysis 
The data were analyzed using the Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences version 16.0 (SPSS Inc., 2008). The categori-
cal variables gender and handedness were subject to Pearson 
chi-square analyses. The data from the clinical and psycho-
logical measures were analyzed with independent-samples t 
tests (OCD and healthy control group) and one-way analysis 
variance (ANOVA; patients in OC symptom dimensions and 
healthy control group). The data from the neuropsychologi-
cal task performance were submitted to repeated-measures 
ANOVA, one-way ANOVA and independent-samples t test. 
Post-hoc least significant difference tests were performed to 
follow up main effects. The partial eta squared (Ƞ²p) was 
used as an effect size measure, which indicates the propor-
tion of total variability attributable to a factor. A Ƞ²p of .01 is 
considered a small effect size, .059 a medium effect size and 
≥ .138 a large effect size (Cohen, 1988). The error bars in 
figures represent the standard error of the mean. In the 
OCD group, correlations between the Y-BOCS, MADRS, 
STAI-state, STAI-trait, CAIOC and the neuropsychological 
task measures were examined using Pearson product-
moment correlation.  
Results  
Demographic, clinical, and psychological background 
measures  
Patients in the symptom dimensions and the healthy control 
group did not differ in gender, handedness, age, years in 
formal education, and predicted verbal IQ, while, as ex-
pected, patients in all symptom dimensions had significantly 
higher scores on the clinical measures compared to the 
healthy controls (p < .01 for all, Table 1). On the LoC, the 
healthy control group selected fewer external control of 
event statements compared to patients in the dimensions 
aggression (p = .016), symmetry/order (p = .032), and sex-
ual/religious (p = .032). In OCD severity, patients with 
aggression symptoms had significantly higher scores com-
pared to patients in the dimensions symmetry/order (p = 
.050) and sexual/religious (p = .015) and marginally higher 
than patients with safety concerns (p = .053). On the 
CAIOC it was revealed that patients in the dimension sex-
ual/religious were significantly less impaired compared to 
patients in the dimensions aggression (p = .038) and symme-
try/order (p = .037). Psychosocial (SDS) impairment was 
significantly higher in patients with symmetry/order com-
pared to sexual/religious symptomatology (p = .046).  
IGT – OCD and healthy controls 
The difference in the number of cards selected from the 
disadvantageous (A and B) and advantageous (C and D) card 
decks was compared between the OCD and the healthy 
control group. Results revealed that the two groups drew the 
similar number of cards from the disadvantageous (OCD: 
Mean (M) = 48.8, SD = 13.3; controls: M = 48.3, SD = 
15.4) and advantageous card decks (OCD: M = 51.2, SD = 
13.3; controls: M = 51.7, SD = 15.4). Further, the total of 
100 cards selected was sub-divided into five blocks of 20 
cards to examine the pattern of decision-making responses 
over time. For each block the number of disadvantageous 
card selections was used as the dependent variable. The 
mean number of disadvantageous card selections for each of 
the five blocks in the healthy control and OCD group is 
displayed in Figure 1.     
The number of disadvantageous card selections per block 
revealed a main effect for block, F (4, 133) = 8.247, p < 
.001, Ƞ²p = .199, indicating that both groups shifted their 
preference from the disadvantageous to the advantageous 
card decks over time. A group and block interaction was also 
identified, F (4, 133) = 2.810, p = .028, Ƞ²p = .078. The 
group differences at each block were analyzed with indepen-
dent samples t-tests. In block one, there was a trend towards 
a group difference because the OCD patients (M = 11.3, SD 
= 3.2) selected more disadvantageous cards compared to the 
healthy controls (M = 10.3, SD = 3.6), t (136) = 1.710, p = 
.089.  
IGT – symptom dimensions and healthy controls 
The mean numbers of disadvantageous card selections in the 
five blocks for patients in the symptom dimensions and the 
healthy control group are displayed in Table 2. 
The performance over the five blocks revealed a main effect 
for block, F (4, 129) = 8.444, p < .001, Ƞ²p = .207 and a 
group and block interaction, F (20, 528) = 1.714, p = .028, 
Ƞ²p = .061. To examine the interaction one-way ANOVAs 
were conducted. The result for disadvantageous card selec-
tions in block 2 was approaching significance (see Table 2), 
F (5, 132) = 2.144, p = .064. Post hoc analysis revealed that 
patients in the dimension aggression selected significantly 
fewer disadvantageous cards compared to patients in the 
dimensions safety (p = .014), symmetry/order (p = .011) and 
contamination (p = .016) whereas the performance against 
the healthy control group was marginally significant (p = 
.059). Furthermore, paired-samples t tests were conducted 
separately for each symptom dimension to investigate
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Table 1. Clinical and psychological characteristics for patients in the OC symptom dimensions (SA, safety; AG, aggression; SO, symmetry/order; CO, contamina-
tion; SR, sexual/religious) and the healthy control group (HC) 
 
 SA 
(n = 23) 
AG
(n = 7) 
SO
(n = 14) 
CO
(n = 22) 
SR
(n = 6) 
HC
(n = 66) 
 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F-value 
Age 43.4 12.8 39.4 15.6 40.9 14.7 41.3 10.7 42.2 11.8 37.6 14.4 n.s. 
Education 3.9 2.4 2.6 2.7 4.1 3.8 4.0 2.9 2.7 2.6 4.0 2.0 n.s. 
Verbal IQ 114.2 2.7 115.4 4.0 115.0 6.3 116.6 6.4 115.0 3.9 115.8 5.9 n.s. 
Y-BOCS 18.7 6.3 23.3 8.2 18.3 8.2 20.0 8.3 15.8 3.6 2.3 2.0 67.560*** 
MADRS 13.0 7.4 17.1 8.4 15.8 8.6 12.9 6.8 11.2 5.1 3.3 2.9 24.697*** 
STAI-state 51.7 15.3 52.0 13.9 50.4 15.7 51.2 13.4 51.8 10.6 32.5 10.0 15.843*** 
STAI-trait 56.0 11.6 58.7 11.1 54.6 14.9 56.2 9.8 55.3 3.4 36.7 9.5 23.357*** 
CAIOC 60.7 16.4 66.9 14.8 64.4 23.3 61.3 21.3 47.0 13.6 28.4 14.4 26.511*** 
CPAS 13.3 5.5 17.0 5.2 15.9 5.4 14.8 6.5 11.7 4.2 6.0 3.3 24.392*** 
SDS 15.8 6.8 16.1 7.2 17.5 8.5 16.3 8.0 11.3 3.1 3.6 4.8 27.816*** 
LoC 12.7 3.7 15.0 4.1 13.9 3.1 13.1 4.1 14.8 3.2 11.7 3.1 2.646* 
Note. CAIOC-18, Cognitive Assessment Instrument of Obsessions and Compulsions; CPAS, Compulsive Personality Assessment Scale; LoC, Locus of Control; MADRS, 
Montgomery-Åsberg Depression Rating Scale; SD, Standard Deviation; SDS, Sheehan Disability Scale; STAI, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; Y-BOCS, Yale-Brown Obsessive–
Compulsive Scale; df (one-way ANOVA) = 5,132; ***p < .001; *p < .05 
 
 
Table 2. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) in the OC symptom dimensions (SA, safety; AG, aggression; SO, symmetry/order; CO, contamination; SR, sex-
ual/religious) and the healthy control group (HC) for disadvantageous card selections by block on the IGT 
 
 SA 
(n = 23) 
AG
(n = 7) 
SO
(n = 14) 
CO
(n = 22) 
SR
(n = 6) 
HC
(n = 66) 
 
Variable M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD F-value Ƞ²p 
Block 1 11.7 4.2 11.4 2.8 11.3 1.9 11.4 2.4 9.5 4.9 10.3 3.6 <1 .036 
Block 2 11.2 4.9 6.1 5.2 11.7 4.6 11.1 3.8 8.0 6.9 9.7 4.6 2.144 .075 
Block 3 10.1 5.5 6.6 3.3 8.1 4.0 8.1 3.7 7.3 4.5 9.4 4.3 1.317 .048 
Block 4 10.4 4.8 11.9 5.7 10.6 3.8 8.6 3.7 9.2 3.9 9.5 4.2 <1 .034 
Block 5 8.4 5.3 7.6 5.3 8.7 4.1 8.0 4.3 10.7 6.5 9.5 4.6 <1 .026 
Note. df (one-way ANOVA) = 5,132 
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Table 3. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) in the OC symptom dimensions (SA, safety; AG, aggression; SO, symmetry/order; CO, contamination; SR, sex-
ual/religious) and healthy control group (HC) for the CGT task measures 
 
SA 
(n = 22) 
AG
(n = 6) 
SO
(n = 13) 
CO
(n = 21) 
SR
(n = 5) 
HC
(n = 64) 
 
Variable M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD F-value Ƞ²p 
Rational 6:4 (%) 87.2 21.0 90.6 11.0 80.3 30.7 89.9 16.0 81.3 28.3 94.1 9.4 2.066 .076 
Rational 7:3 (%) 89.8 17.0 91.7 17.5 80.3 35.0 92.0 12.5 78.8 31.1 94.7 9.6 2.264* .083 
Rational 8:2 (%) 94.3 15.7 89.6 20.0 88.9 23.8 94.1 13.0 77.5 37.1 96.4 7.3 2.075 .077 
Rational 9:1 (%) 97.5 5.6 97.3 5.0 91.7 16.7 97.4 5.8 89.1 10.9 98.4 3.3 3.436** .121 
Deliberation 6:4 (ms) 2861 1100 2266 775 2323 987 2794 958 2661 580 2351 859 1.633 .061 
Deliberation 7:3 (ms) 2667 753 2144 512 2434 1083 2710 941 2597 786 2213 691 2.069 .076 
Deliberation 8:2 (ms) 2490 909 2199 400 2118 610 2529 827 2598 792 1989 579 3.280** .116 
Deliberation 9:1 (ms) 2394 706 1986 242 2304 684 2351 760 2343 539 1949 658 1.911 .073 
Points gambled 6:4 (%) 36.0 18.6 55.2 20.1 47.2 26.1 52.8 18.1 48.4 13.7 47.7 13.7 2.608* .094 
Points gambled 7:3 (%) 46.9 16.3 62.9 17.7 53.4 27.0 58.8 17.0 52.0 11.8 58.2 14.2 1.998 .074 
Points gambled 8:2 (%) 57.2 17.9 67.4 21.1 67.6 18.9 66.2 14.2 58.6 13.4 67.0 14.2 1.604 .060 
Points gambled 9:1 (%) 66.6 19.1 66.5 19.1 75.2 19.2 72.5 15.0 66.0 24.6 71.6 15.9 <1 .025 
Note. ms, milliseconds; df (one-way ANOVA) = 5,125; **p < .01; *p < .05 
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Figure 1. Mean number of disadvantageous card selections for each block in 
the healthy control and OCD group 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean percentage of rational decisions as a function of the ratio of red 
and blue boxes in the healthy control and OCD group  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean percentage of rational decisions as a function of the ratio of red 
and blue boxes in the healthy control group and patients in the OC symptom 
dimensions 
  
Figure 4. Mean deliberation time (milliseconds) as a function of the ratio of red 
and blue boxes in the healthy control group and patients in the OC symptom 
dimensions 
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whether the number of disadvantageous card selections 
differed between the blocks (Table 2). Results indicated that 
patients in the dimension safety selected a significantly high-
er number of cards from the bad card decks in block 1 com-
pared to block 5, t (22) = 2.812, p = .010; patients in the 
dimension aggression chose a significantly higher number of 
cards from the bad card decks in block 1 compared to 
blocks 2, t (6) = 2.438, p = .050 and 3, t (6) = 3.232, p = 
.018; patients in the dimension symmetry/order selected a 
significantly higher number of cards from the bad card decks 
in block 1 compared to 3, t (13) = 2.990, p = .010 and 5, t 
(13) = 2.665, p = .019 as well as in block 4 compared to 5, t 
(13) = 2.535, p = .025 and patients in the dimension con-
tamination chose a significantly higher number of cards from 
the bad card decks in block 1 compared to blocks 3, t (21) = 
4.035, p = .001, 4, t (21) = 3.369, p = .003 and 5, t (21) = 
3.876, p = .001. 
Rational decisions, CGT – OCD and healthy controls  
For this type of analysis data for five OCD and two healthy 
control participants were either not collected or were unus-
able due to technical errors. 
Rational decisions are characterized by the ability of partici-
pants in choosing the most likely outcomes. The percentage 
of rational decisions in the ascending and descending condi-
tions at the different color ratios revealed a main effect for 
color ratio, F (3, 127) = 11.874, p < .001, Ƞ²p = .219 indicat-
ing that participants made more rational decisions at the 
more favorable ratios of red and blue boxes. The OCD 
patients made significantly fewer rational decisions than the 
healthy control group at the color ratios 6:4, (t (129) = 2.692, 
p = .008, 7:3, t (129) = 2.291, p = .024 and 9:1, t (129) = 
2.194, p = .030 and marginally fewer at the color ratio 8:2, t 
(129) = 1.906, p = .059 (see Figure 2). 
Deliberation time, CGT – OCD and healthy controls  
Deliberation time is associated with how long time the par-
ticipants need to decide whether the yellow token is hidden 
behind a blue or a red box. The deliberation time in the 
ascending and descending conditions at the different color 
ratios revealed a main effect for color ratio, F (3, 127) = 
14.857, p < .001, Ƞ²p = .260 indicating that participants had 
shorter deliberation times at the more favorable ratios of 
colored boxes. The OCD patients deliberated significantly 
longer than the healthy controls before making a decision at 
the color ratios 7:3 (OCD: M = 2583 milliseconds (ms), SD 
= 865; controls: M = 2213 ms, SD = 691), t (129) = 2.695, p 
= .008, 8:2 (OCD: M = 2412 ms, SD = 786; controls: M = 
1989 ms, SD = 579), t (129) = 3.496, p = .001 and 9:1 
(OCD: M = 2290 ms, SD = 671; controls: M = 1949 ms, SD 
= 658), t (129) = 2.938, p = .004 and marginally longer at the 
color ratio 6:4 (OCD: M = 2667 ms, SD = 981; controls: M 
= 2351 ms, SD = 859), t (129) = 1.960, p = .052.  
 
Points gambled, CGT – OCD and healthy controls  
The amount of points risked in order to increase the total 
amount of scores is associated with points gambled. The 
percentage of points gambled in the ascending and descend-
ing conditions at the different color ratios revealed a main 
effect for color ratio, F (3, 127) = 67.841, p < .001, Ƞ²p = 
.616, indicating that participants placed higher bets on more 
likely outcomes, and a main effect for condition, F (1, 129) = 
134.828, p < .001, Ƞ²p = .511, indicating that participants 
placed higher bets in the descending condition compared to 
the ascending (Figure not shown). Independent-samples t 
tests confirmed that the groups did not differ in the percen-
tage of points gambled at the different color ratios (6:4 - 
OCD: M = 46.1, SD = 20.8; controls: M = 47.7, SD = 13.7; 
7:3 - OCD: M = 53.7, SD = 19.2; controls: M = 58.2, SD = 
14.2; 8:2 - OCD: M = 63.1, SD = 17.2; controls: M = 67.0, 
SD = 14.2; 9:1 - OCD: M = 70.1, SD = 18.2; controls: M = 
71.6, SD = 15.9). 
Rational decisions, CGT – symptom dimensions and 
healthy controls  
The means and standard deviations for rational decisions, 
deliberation time and points gambled for patients in the 
symptom dimensions and healthy control group are dis-
played in Table 3. For rational decisions (see Figure 3 and 
Table 3), results revealed a main effect for color ratio, F (3, 
123) = 7.950, p < .001, Ƞ²p = .162, indicating that partici-
pants made more rational decisions at the more favorable 
ratios of red and blue boxes. A one-way ANOVA for the 6:4 
ratio was approaching significance, F (5, 125) = 2.066, p = 
.074. Post hoc analysis revealed that patients in the dimen-
sion symmetry/order were less rational than the healthy 
controls (p = .007). The ANOVA for the 7:3 ratio was mar-
ginally significant, F (5, 125) = 2.264, p = .052 and post hoc 
tests revealed that the healthy controls were significantly 
more rational compared to patients in the dimensions sym-
metry/order (p = .005) and sexual/religious (p = .042) and 
in addition patients in the dimension contamination per-
formed significantly better than patients in the dimension 
symmetry/order (p = .050). The ANOVA for the 8:2 ratio 
was also approaching significance, F (5, 125) = 2.075, p = 
.073, and post hoc analysis revealed that patients in the di-
mension sexual/religious were significantly less rational 
compared to patients in the dimensions safety (p = .021), 
contamination (p = .023) and the healthy control group (p = 
.006). The ANOVA for the 9:1 ratio was significant, F (5, 
125) = 3.436, p = .006 and post hoc tests revealed that pa-
tients in the dimensions sexual/religious and symme-
try/order made significantly fewer rational decisions com-
pared to patients in the dimensions safety (p = .015 and p = 
.017 respectively), contamination (p = .017 and p = .021 
respectively) and the healthy controls (p = .004 and p = .002 
respectively).   
Deliberation time, CGT – symptom dimensions and 
healthy controls  
For deliberation time (see Figure 4 and Table 3), results 
revealed a main effect for color ratio, F (3, 123) = 6.016, p = 
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.001, Ƞ²p = .128, indicating that participants deliberated 
shorter at the more favorable ratios. Post hoc analysis (6:4 
ratio) revealed that patients in the dimension safety delibe-
rated significantly longer compared to the healthy control 
group (p = .027) and patients in the dimension contamina-
tion deliberated marginally longer than the healthy controls 
(p = .058). The ANOVA for the 7:3 ratio was approaching 
significance, F (5, 125) = 2.069, p = .074, the ANOVA for 
the 8:2 ratio was significant, F (5, 125) = 3.280, p = .008 and 
the ANOVA for the 9:1 ratio was approaching significance, 
F (5, 125) = 1.981, p = .086. Post hoc analysis for all three 
color ratios revealed that patients in the dimensions safety 
and contamination deliberated significantly longer prior to 
choosing the most likely outcome compared to the healthy 
controls (7:3 - p = .021 and p = .013 respectively; 8:2 - p = 
.004 and p = .002 respectively; 9:1 - p = .039 and p = .019 
respectively).     
Points gambled, CGT – symptom dimensions and 
healthy controls  
For points gambled (see Table 3), a main effect for color 
ratio was identified, F (3, 123) = 28.295, p < .001, Ƞ²p = 
.408, indicating that participants placed higher bets on more 
likely outcomes, and a main effect for condition, F (1, 125) = 
73.515, p < .001, Ƞ²p = .370, indicating that participants 
placed higher bets in the descending condition compared to 
the ascending. A one-way ANOVA for the 6:4 ratio was 
significant, F (5, 125) = 2.608, p = .028 and the ANOVA for 
the 7:3 ratio was approaching significance, F (5, 125) = 
1.998, p = .083. Post hoc analysis revealed that patients in 
the dimension safety gambled significantly fewer points 
compared to the patients in the dimensions aggression, con-
tamination and the healthy controls (6:4 - p = .016, p = .002 
and p = .006 respectively; 7:3 - p = .038, p = .020 and p = 
.007 respectively). Post hoc tests (8:2 ratio) revealed that 
patients in the dimension safety risked significantly fewer 
points compared to the healthy controls (p = .012). 
Correlation analysis 
In the OCD group, correlations were performed to examine 
the relationship between the performance on the decision-
making tasks and the clinical variables. On the CGT, there 
was a significant positive correlation between Y-BOCS and 
points gambled at the 9:1 color ratio, r (67) = .27, p = .028 
and a significant negative correlation between CAIOC and 
rational decision at the 9:1 color ratio, r (67) = - .27, p = 
.037. Significant negative correlations were also found be-
tween deliberation times at all the color ratios and rational 
decisions at all the color ratios (range: - .29 (p = .019) to - 
.57 (p < .001), n = 67).  
Discussion 
The results of this study demonstrated that the OCD pa-
tients were impaired in rational decision-making and delibe-
ration time to make a decision, whereas the number of 
points risked on the decisions was intact. Patients in the 
dimensions symmetry/order and sexual/religious were im-
paired in rational decision-making and patients in the dimen-
sions safety and contamination were impaired in time taken 
to make a decision. Patients with safety concerns bet signifi-
cantly reduced amounts of points on their decisions. Delibe-
ration time in patients with safety concerns was impaired as 
predicted.  
The impairment in rational decision-making in the OCD 
group is in contrast to Watkins et al. (2005), reporting intact 
performance in OCD patients but confirmed impairments in 
rational decision-making in Tourette’s syndrome patients. 
Inhibitory control mechanisms appear dysfunctional in both 
disorders (Watkins et al., 2005) and may explain why these 
patients are unable to make rational decisions. Intact per-
formance on the CGT in OCD was also found in Chamber-
lain et al. (2007a, b). Therefore, in extension to the previous 
studies the current findings indicate impairments in decision-
making related to rational gambling behavior in OCD. Most 
of the patients were on selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor 
medication and the difficulties in decision making could even 
have been worse if the present investigation had been per-
formed with unmedicated patients (e.g., Cavedini et al., 
2002). 
Furthermore, it was found that the OCD patients were not 
impaired on the IGT, which confirms previous results (Law-
rence et al., 2006; Nielen et al., 2002). However, there were 
indications that patients in the dimension aggression per-
formed superior in block 2 compared to patients in the di-
mensions safety, symmetry/order and contamination, but in 
block 4 patients in the dimension aggression seem to have 
switched their response pattern away from the good decks. 
However, when examining in more detail the frequency of 
disadvantageous card selections in all five blocks in the dif-
ferent symptom dimensions, it becomes evident that only 
patients in the dimensions safety and contamination similar 
to the healthy control participants appear to shift the selec-
tion of cards deliberately from bad decks to good decks over 
the course of the task. In contrast, patients in the dimensions 
aggression, symmetry/order and sexual/religious seem to 
draw cards randomly from different card decks, switching 
between good and bad decks, without a strategic preference 
over time for the good decks. Therefore, the performance in 
these patients (in particular symmetry/order and aggression) 
does not appear to be deliberate and conscious but more as a 
results of trial and error. The intact performance in patients 
with contamination fear on the IGT confirms an earlier 
finding and hoarders remain therefore the only patient di-
mension demonstrating deficits (Lawrence et al., 2006).  
The impairment for patients in the dimension sex-
ual/religious in rational decision-making on the CGT ap-
peared to be particularly unusual, because of the impaired 
performance at the different color ratios. The obsessional 
thoughts in these patients often revolve around making 
judgments about morally and ethically right and wrong be-
haviors. The current deficit for rational choices seem to 
reflect impairments in affective cognitive decision-making, 
which may explain the faulty information processing related 
to these patients’ obsessional fears. The patients in the di-
mension symmetry/order did also display deficits in rational 
decision-making behavior for almost all color ratios. It may 
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well be that symmetrical and perfectionist responses could 
have influenced the detrimental performance because of an 
inability to focus on the right aspect of the task. Their cogni-
tive style appears therefore dysfunctional and these patients 
together with patients in the dimension sexual/religious may 
not have been aware of the different contingencies due to 
deficits in attention for particular details of the task.  
The current study seems one of the first to comprehensively 
assess different aspects of decision-making behavior in 
OCD. The lack of differences on the IGT between groups 
and selective impairments on the CGT highlight specific 
characteristics of each task. The IGT is thought to measure 
decision-making related to ambiguous choices despite that it 
was originally launched as a measure of risky decision-
making (Bechara, 2007), whereas the CGT is related to risky 
gambling behavior only (Clark et al., 2008). Recently, the 
IGT has been criticized for the ambiguities of what aspects 
of decision-making it measures (risky, ambiguous or both) 
and it is unclear how personality and state mood could affect 
performance (Buelow & Suhr, 2009). In line with these ar-
guments it has been claimed that the early card selections on 
the IGT are associated with ambiguous decision-making 
whereas the last half of the blocks relates to decision-making 
under risk (Brand et al., 2007). This is suggested because 
during the early stages of the task participants have not had 
the time to experience the win/loss contingencies for the 
deck choices and this is in contrast to the last half of the task 
where these contingencies should have been picked up 
through winning (good decks) and losing (bad decks). Brand 
and colleagues (2007) further argue that the dividing line 
between where ambiguous card selections become risky 
during the game is not clear-cut. In addition, poor perform-
ance on the IGT may be due to a preference for immediate 
high rewards (impulsivity), a preference for reward irrespec-
tive of punishment (losses) or it could be due to problems 
with reversal learning, set-shifting or working memory (Clark 
& Manes, 2004). Recently, a group of OCD patients was 
found to be impaired on the IGT (Starcke et al., 2010) but 
not the Game of Dice Task, developed by Brand et al. 
(2005), which assesses risky decision-making. Risky decision-
making has been found to correlate with executive task per-
formance (Wisconsin Card Sorting Test) both in OCD pa-
tients and in healthy controls whereas in healthy participants 
only the IGT performance seemed to correlate with execu-
tive task performance and dorsolateral PFC activity (Starcke 
et al., 2010). In the current study the proposed problem 
between ambiguous and risky choices on the IGT seems to 
have been accounted for because decision-making by block 
performance was investigated and a dysfunctional strategy of 
card selections was indeed found for patients in the dimen-
sions aggression and symmetry/order. This finding high-
lights the fact that the specific characteristics of the symp-
tom dimension performance cannot be revealed if overall 
summary results for each task are analyzed and which are 
often reported in the literature (e.g., Chamberlain et al., 
2007a, b). The present findings confirm that only a detailed 
analysis of result patterns will indicate these differences 
which can be interpreted as the evidence for different cogni-
tive specificity according to specific task characteristics (e.g., 
Dittrich et al., 2011b; Henderson & Dittrich, 1993).  
An important question seems the extent to which the per-
formance on the IGT and the CGT depends on executive 
processes such as planning, cognitive flexibility and working 
memory (Clark & Manes, 2004). The IGT also taps the ex-
ecutive processes of working memory and strategy learning 
(Clark & Manes, 2004; Hinson et al., 2002) and neuroimag-
ing and lesion studies have revealed widespread involvement 
of frontal regions (Manes et al., 2002). In contrast, the CGT 
seems to be a more one-sided task without implicating work-
ing memory as in each trial exclusive information is available, 
and mainly depending on ventral PFC involvement (Clark & 
Manes, 2004). However, here it is proposed that in the case 
of a gain/loss scenario (CGT) the decision-making process is 
also strongly affected, if any of the memory elements are 
dysfunctional. For example, it can be assumed that partici-
pants will consider computer based gain/loss tasks in a visu-
al sense and not only through the verbal mode (high value 
bet/card and low value bet/card). In terms of Baddeley’s 
model (1992), the activation state for the verbal mode cor-
responding to the articulatory rehearsal would be lower than 
the activation level for the sketchpad corresponding to the 
visual mode (Baddeley, 1986) and deficits in visual 
processing is thought to underlie many of the dysfunctional 
behaviors in OCD (Gonçalves et al., 2010; Rubies et al., 
2001). Therefore, selective visual processing deficits related 
to risky decision-making (CGT) may be specific to patients 
in all symptom dimensions except for those with aggression 
concerns who were the only patients not showing selective 
deficits on the CGT.  
Following the concept of information processing it has been 
suggested that OCD behavior stems from a failure to spe-
cifically process emotional signals adequately (Dittrich et al., 
2010a) and detect one’s own behavioral output (Szechtman 
& Woody, 2004). OCD patients seem unable to generate a 
normal ‘feeling of knowing’ experience that would signal 
task completion (Szechtman & Woody, 2004). The authors 
relate this to a dysfunctional security motivational system 
where emotion-based feedback processes are assumed to be 
impaired. Similar deficient emotional processes that accom-
pany the experiences of impaired ‘feeling of knowing’ or of a 
feeling of ‘incompleteness’ may be closely linked to the often 
reported ‘not just right’ experience (Coles et al., 2005; Ecker 
& Gönner, 2008). These experiences would have implica-
tions for decision-making tasks such as the CGT as impaired 
rational decision-making may signal dysfunctional ‘feeling of 
knowing’ and ‘not just right’ experiences in patients with 
symmetry/order and sexual/religious concerns. It still re-
mains an open question why a decision is not completed 
because OCD patients find it difficult to make the decision 
to shift a response pattern when that is required (Dittrich et 
al., 2010b; Veale et al., 1996). Alternatively to the role of 
uncertainty and ambiguity, impaired decision-making can be 
seen as a result of difficulties in processing information 
adequately in the light of strong emotional activation (e.g., 
Williams et al., 1997). Similarly, it has been shown that dur-
ing decision-making, bodily states are associated with previ-
ous choice options as described in the somatic marker hy-
pothesis (Damasio, 1996). On both the IGT and the CGT 
each decision seems to be related to a positive or negative 
emotion depending on the outcome and they can therefore 
be assumed to measure emotional decision-making, but the 
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question of cognitive factors in decision-making is not re-
solved because the integrity of the executive process seems 
important in emotional decision-making.  
The important message from the current study is the evi-
dence for selective deficits according to patients in different 
symptom dimensions related to risky decision-making of 
rationality (symmetry/order, sexual/religious), deliberation 
time (safety, contamination) and risk assessment (safety) and 
support the symptomatological approach to study OCD. 
Therefore, the heterogeneity in the findings on decision-
making in OCD (CGT and IGT) is likely to be explained by 
OCD group sizes and neglecting performances by patients in 
different symptom dimensions.  
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